Opening Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO)

Joint Hearing on Status of the War and Political Developments in Iraq

Today, the House Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs jointly meet for what may be the most important hearing of the year. We have today the pleasure to welcome two of America’s finest, General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and I would like to thank them for appearing. It is wonderful to see you both again. Let me remind members that the testimony we will be receiving reflects the best judgment of these leaders. Later this week, the Congress will receive the Presidential report required by the 2007 supplemental appropriations bill which will reflect the reports of our two witnesses.

I also want to start this hearing by commending all of those—the troops and foreign service officers—who serve under you. Their mission is most challenging. They, and their families, have sacrificed tremendously and have served valiantly. We know that where there has been progress on the ground, it is due to their heroic efforts.

Today is a critical moment. This Congress and this nation are divided on the pace with which the United States should turn over responsibility to the Iraqis. But every member here desires that we complete our military involvement in Iraq in a way that best preserves the national security of the United States.

I think that is where we must begin, by considering the overall security of this nation. It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure the United States military can deter and, if needed, prevail anywhere our interests are threatened. Iraq is an important piece of that overall equation, but it is only a piece.

There are very real tradeoffs when we send one hundred and sixty thousand of our men and women in uniform to Iraq. Those troops in Iraq are not available for other missions. They are not available to go to Afghanistan to pursue Osama bin Laden and the other Al Qaeda leaders who ordered an attack on us one day short of six years ago.

These troops and their depleted equipment are also not easily available to respond to a new conflict that might emerge. It is the issue of readiness. My colleagues have heard me say this before, but in my 30 years in Congress, we have been involved in 12 military contingencies, some of them major in scope, almost all unexpected. Right now, with so many troops in Iraq, I think our response to an unexpected threat would come at a devastating cost.

Our troops have become outstanding at counter-insurgencies. But we need them prepared for the full spectrum of combat. This is a lesson we learn again and again. In 1921, in his book, “America’s Duty”, General Leonard Wood addressed a similar situation from his day. “The Spanish War gave little training, as did the Philippine insurrection. Campaigns of this kind are of limited value as a preparation for war with an organized prepared power.”

Wars stress armies, but we should make sure that the strain on our force is undertaken consciously, and that this war is vital to our national security. We must be sure, before we talk about continuing this effort, that Iraq is the war worth the risk of breaking our army and being unable to deal with other risks to our nation.

That is the strategic context in which I consider the situation in Iraq today. Prominent for me is also how we have gotten to where we are in Iraq. We remember the discussion of weapons of mass destruction, the “Mission Accomplished” sign, and General Garner’s short tenure. We recall Paul Bremer, the long debate over the summer of 2004 about whether or not there was an insurgency, and the grudging admission from the then-Secretary of Defense that fall that, yes, there was in fact a growing insurgency.

We recall the first and second battles of Fallujah, and the idea that we could quickly train the Iraqi Security Forces to replace us. We should remember this history as we evaluate the current status of our efforts in Iraq. The surge is just the latest in a long line of operations. It frankly looks as if there has been tactical progress in the security area, but we should at this point temper any enthusiasm with the caveat that this is Iraq, and nothing has been easy there. In a poll of Iraqis released this morning sponsored by ABC News, the BBC, and the Japanese broadcaster NHK, we learned that at least 65% of Iraqis say the surge is not working and 72% say the US presence is making Iraq’s security worse. This is troublesome.

I believe our valiant troops are likely improving security in the areas where they are deployed. This makes good sense. They’re the best, so of course things improve when we deploy more of them. Some called for more forces to be deployed immediately after the invasion, and we just might have avoided a lot of the current troubles. One of the great ironies of this hearing today is that General Petraeus who sits here before us is almost certainly the right man for the job in Iraq, but he’s the right person three years too late and 250,000 troops short. If we had your vision and approach, General, early on, we may not have gotten to the point where our troops are caught in the midst of brutal sectarian fighting without an Iraqi government bridging the political divides that drive this violence.

This surge was intended to provide “breathing space” for the Iraqis to bridge sectarian divides with real political compromises. But while our troops are holding back the opposing team to let them make a touchdown the Iraqis haven’t even picking up the ball. The President’s July report and the GAO report of a few days ago showed the lack of progress on individual benchmarks, and no one can make the case that the Iraqi government has made great strides. The witnesses must tell us why we should continue sending our young men and women to fight and die if the Iraqis won’t make the tough sacrifices leading to reconciliation? What is the likelihood that things will change dramatically and there will be political progress in the near term? Are we merely beating a dead horse?

The Commission on the Iraqi Security Forces, chaired by retired General Jim Jones and which my committee heard from just the other day, puts it well, “At the end of the day, however, the future of Iraq…hinges on the ability of the Iraqi people and the government to begin the process of achieving national reconciliation and to ending sectarian violence. For the time being, all progress seems to flow from this most pressing requirement.”

These are powerful words, and it’s a powerful truth. But the disappointing part is that the Iraqis have not stepped up to that challenge. We know there have been local political gains. In Anbar province, the Marines have done impressive work helping to turn local sheiks and tribal leaders against Al Qaeda in Iraq. It may well be that such local, tactical gains will set the stage for the political partition of Iraq. This may carry with it additional problems.

Cementing any progress requires reconciliation at the national level. Does anyone think that a national government, run by sectarian Shiite and Kurdish leaders will, in the long run, provide funds and arms to former Sunni insurgents who they suspect still wish to overthrow them? And how long will the Sunnis wait quietly to be given assurances about revenue and power sharing?

I hope, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, that you can persuade us that there is substantial reason to believe that Iraq will turn around in the very near future. But you have the burden of answering these fundamental questions to those of us who have been watching Iraq for years. And every promising development has so far not turned out to be the solution we hoped.

Columnist Tom Friedman said something wise in a column not long ago. He asked, “‘What will convey to you…that the surge is working and worth sustaining?’” His answer was, “If I saw…Iraq’s Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni leaders stepping forward, declaring their willingness to work out their differences by a set deadline and publicly asking us to stay until they do.” I think he had a point, and one we need to keep in mind while we consider where we go from here in Iraq. The Iraqi leaders have not done this, and sadly I don’t think there is any likelihood they will in the near future.

I now turn to Chairman Lantos for any comments he might wish to make.

###